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Propositional attitude

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propositions themselves, returning to matters of language and logic. Despite the name, propositional attitudes are not regarded as psychological attitudes proper, since the formal disciplines of linguistics and logic are concerned with nothing more concrete than what can be said in general about their formal properties and their patterns of interaction.
36: 267:"Giorgione", an Italian name roughly glossed as "Big George." The basis of the paradox here is that while the two names signify the same individual (the meaning of the first statement), the names are not themselves identical; the second statement refers to an attribute (origin) that they do not share. 347:
of relating an object to a proposition. As I have been explaining, that is not what they really do, but it is convenient to call them propositional verbs. Of course you might call them 'attitudes', but I should not like that because it is a psychological term, and although all the instances in our
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One topic of central concern is the relation between the modalities of assertion and belief, perhaps with intention thrown in for good measure. Discrepancies can occur as to whether or not a person's assertions conform to their beliefs. When the departure of assertion from belief is intentional, it
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Many problematic situations in real life arise from the circumstance that many different propositions in many different modalities are in the air at once. In order to compare propositions of different colours and flavours, as it were, there is no basis for comparison but to examine the underlying
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Propositional attitudes are often assumed to be the fundamental units of thought and their contents, being propositions, are true or false from the perspective of the person. An agent can have different propositional attitudes toward the same proposition (e.g., "S believes that her ice-cream is
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How one feels about or regards a proposition is different than what a proposition is – they can be accepted, asserted, believed, commanded, contested, declared, denied, doubted, enjoined, exclaimed, or expected, for example. Different attitudes toward propositions are called
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Other comparisons of multiple modalities that frequently arise are the relationships between belief and knowledge and the discrepancies that occur among observations, expectations, and intentions. Deviations of observations from expectations are commonly perceived as
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What sort of name shall we give to verbs like 'believe' and 'wish' and so forth? I should be inclined to call them 'propositional verbs'. This is merely a suggested name for convenience, because they are verbs which have the
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experience are psychological, there is no reason to suppose that all the verbs I am talking of are psychological. There is never any reason to suppose that sort of thing. (Russell 1918, 227).
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One of the fundamental principles governing identity is that of substitutivity, also known as fungibility â€” or, as it might well be called, that of
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Awbrey, J. and Awbrey, S.(1995), "Interpretation as Action: The Risk of Inquiry", Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines 15, 40–52.
1374: 673:, 1st published 1912. Reprinted, Galaxy Book, Oxford University Press, New York, NY, 1959. Reprinted, Prometheus Books, Buffalo, NY, 1988. 229:
given a true statement of identity, one of its two terms may be substituted for the other in any true statement and the result will be true
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that states a Knowledge (XXG) editor's personal feelings or presents an original argument about a topic.
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Quine, W.V. (1980 b), "Reference and Modality", pp. 139–159 in Quine (1980 a),
231:. It is easy to find cases contrary to this principle. For example, the statements: 2047: 1967: 1834: 1714: 1598: 1578: 1303: 1293: 1288: 1251: 1201: 998: 978: 968: 898: 818: 1962: 1936: 1819: 1583: 1510: 1369: 1343: 1153: 1066: 1043: 1018: 1003: 973: 903: 878: 853: 848: 715: 693: 412: 402: 280: 142: 101: 93: 116:
cold," and "S fears that her ice-cream is cold"). Propositional attitudes have
2112: 1759: 1525: 1480: 1475: 1206: 1128: 1028: 948: 918: 873: 707:(ed.), Unwin Hyman, London, UK, 1956. Reprinted, Routledge, London, UK, 1992. 600: 97: 1911: 1729: 1654: 1633: 1563: 1515: 1495: 1278: 1211: 1175: 838: 803: 422: 264: 646:, David Hugh Mellor (ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1990. 729: 1824: 1613: 1221: 1338: 751: 688:(ed.), Unwin Hyman, London, UK, 1956. Reprinted, pp. 35–155 in 653:, David Hugh Mellor (ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. 432: 397: 740: 1689: 983: 442: 155: 1313: 1241: 486: 105: 1429: 755: 676:
Russell, Bertrand (1918), "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism",
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Structured meanings. The semantics of propositional attitudes
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personal reflection, personal essay, or argumentative essay
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From a Logical Point of View, Logico-Philosophical Essays
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53 (1956). Reprinted, pp. 185–196 in Quine (1976),
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is a mental state held by an agent or organism toward a
625:, 2nd edition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. 53: 642:, 153–170. Reprinted, pp. 34–51 in F.P. Ramsey, 663:, Littlefield, Adams, and Company, Totowa, NJ, 1962. 2065: 1950: 1854: 1847: 1642: 1551: 1544: 1463: 1362: 1189: 1059: 789: 603:(1956), "Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes", 254:(3) Barbarelli was so called because of his size. 1922:Segmented discourse representation theory (SDRT) 510:Quintessence, extensions, Reference and Modality 357:; they are also discussed under the headings of 238:(2) Giorgione was so called because of his size. 1441: 767: 8: 242:are true; however, replacement of the name 640:Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 7 309:. Unsourced material may be challenged and 104:, propositional attitudes are denoted by a 1851: 1548: 1448: 1434: 1426: 774: 760: 752: 597:. MIT Press, Cambridge & London 1985. 574:Learn how and when to remove this message 329:Learn how and when to remove this message 76:Learn how and when to remove this message 680:, 1918. Reprinted, pp. 177–281 in 537:This article includes a list of general 478: 454: 696:(ed.), Open Court, La Salle, IL, 1985. 158:, the formal properties of verbs like 1877:Discourse representation theory (DRT) 1375:Philosophy of artificial intelligence 701:Logic and Knowledge: Essays 1901–1950 682:Logic and Knowledge: Essays 1901–1950 616:The Ways of Paradox, and Other Essays 7: 307:adding citations to reliable sources 2159:Formal semantics (natural language) 1790:Quantificational variability effect 1457:Formal semantics (natural language) 746:Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy 638:(1927), "Facts and Propositions", 543:it lacks sufficient corresponding 146:to reduce the shock of amazement. 25: 712:The Philosophy of Logical Atomism 690:The Philosophy of Logical Atomism 728: 718:(ed.), Open Court, La Salle, IL. 528: 279: 34: 259:Quine's example here refers to 1872:Combinatory categorial grammar 250:turns (2) into the falsehood: 224:indiscernibility of identicals 210:Indiscernibility of identicals 1: 1650:Antecedent-contained deletion 1232:Hard problem of consciousness 630:From a Logical Point of View 235:(1) Giorgione = Barbarelli, 206:to analysis. (Quine 1956). 2175: 1531:Syntax–semantics interface 710:Russell, Bertrand (1985), 699:Russell, Bertrand (1956), 671:The Problems of Philosophy 213: 140:, phenomena that call for 2023:Question under discussion 1973:Conversational scoreboard 1750:Intersective modification 1735:Homogeneity (linguistics) 1395: 954:Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz 944:David Lewis (philosopher) 2154:Concepts in epistemology 2083:Distributional semantics 661:Dictionary of Philosophy 438:Self-fulfilling prophecy 18:Intentional mental state 2139:Propositional attitudes 2078:Computational semantics 1815:Subsective modification 1619:Propositional attitudes 1082:Eliminative materialism 741:Propositional Attitudes 735:Propositional attitudes 558:more precise citations. 355:propositional attitudes 216:Use–mention distinction 27:Concept in epistemology 2149:Psychological attitude 2108:Philosophy of language 1745:Inalienable possession 1725:Free choice inferences 1720:Faultless disagreement 1491:Generalized quantifier 1334:Propositional attitude 1329:Problem of other minds 1237:Hypostatic abstraction 621:Quine, W.V. (1980 a), 383:Accessibility relation 350: 257: 90:propositional attitude 56:by rewriting it in an 2003:Plural quantification 1897:Inquisitive semantics 1862:Alternative semantics 1405:Philosophers category 1309:Mental representation 1072:Biological naturalism 959:Maurice Merleau-Ponty 934:Frank Cameron Jackson 649:Ramsey, F.P. (1990), 605:Journal of Philosophy 340: 227:. It provides that, 219: 214:Further information: 1988:Function application 1795:Responsive predicate 1785:Privative adjectives 1087:Emergent materialism 737:at Wikimedia Commons 705:Robert Charles Marsh 686:Robert Charles Marsh 651:Philosophical Papers 644:Philosophical Papers 614:Quine, W.V. (1976), 428:Responsive predicate 388:Affect (linguistics) 303:improve this section 2073:Cognitive semantics 2038:Strawson entailment 1983:Existential closure 1927:Situation semantics 1830:Temperature paradox 1800:Rising declaratives 1765:Modal subordination 1740:Hurford disjunction 1700:Discourse relations 1284:Language of thought 1034:Ludwig Wittgenstein 864:Patricia Churchland 366:linguistic modality 2118:Semantics of logic 2043:Strict conditional 2013:Quantifier raising 1978:Downward entailing 1958:Autonomy of syntax 1887:Generative grammar 1867:Categorial grammar 1805:Scalar implicature 1710:Epistemic modality 1685:De dicto and de re 1112:Neurophenomenology 783:Philosophy of mind 657:Runes, Dagobert D. 261:Giorgio Barbarelli 58:encyclopedic style 45:is written like a 2144:Psycholinguistics 2126: 2125: 2098:Logic translation 2061: 2060: 2053:Universal grinder 2033:Squiggle operator 1993:Meaning postulate 1932:Supervaluationism 1902:Intensional logic 1882:Dynamic semantics 1843: 1842: 1675:Crossover effects 1624:Tense–aspect–mood 1604:Lexical semantics 1423: 1422: 1319:Mind–body problem 1217:Cognitive closure 1181:Substance dualism 799:G. E. M. 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room 1048: 999:Gilbert Ryle 979:Derek Parfit 969:Thomas Nagel 899:Fred Dretske 819:J. L. Austin 791:Philosophers 744: 711: 700: 689: 681: 677: 670: 660: 650: 643: 639: 636:Ramsey, F.P. 629: 622: 615: 608: 604: 594: 570: 561: 542: 520:Bibliography 509: 501: 490:. Retrieved 481: 457: 371: 364: 358: 354: 351: 344: 341: 325: 319:January 2024 316: 301:Please help 289: 258: 247: 246:by the name 243: 241: 228: 222: 220: 199: 195: 191: 187: 183: 179: 175: 171: 167: 163: 159: 153: 143:explanations 141: 135: 132: 125: 124:is called a 122: 114: 109: 89: 87: 72: 63: 44: 1963:Context set 1937:Type theory 1820:Subtrigging 1584:Disjunction 1511:Proposition 1379:information 1370:Metaphysics 1344:Tabula rasa 1154:Physicalism 1139:Parallelism 1067:Behaviorism 1024:Michael Tye 1019:Alan Turing 1004:John Searle 879:Dharmakirti 854:Tyler Burge 849:C. D. Broad 716:David Pears 694:David Pears 601:Quine, W.V. 556:introducing 403:Disposition 94:proposition 2133:Categories 2113:Pragmatics 1760:Mirativity 1526:Speech act 1481:Entailment 1476:Denotation 1415:Task Force 1383:perception 1257:Artificial 1207:Creativity 1129:Nondualism 1029:Vasubandhu 949:John Locke 919:David Hume 874:Andy Clark 678:The Monist 564:April 2009 539:references 492:2023-03-07 248:Barbarelli 98:philosophy 1912:Mereology 1848:Formalism 1730:Givenness 1655:Cataphora 1643:Phenomena 1634:Vagueness 1564:Ambiguity 1516:Reference 1496:Intension 1486:Extension 1279:Intuition 1212:Cognition 1176:Solipsism 839:Ned Block 809:Armstrong 804:Aristotle 449:Footnotes 423:Knowledge 290:does not 265:sobriquet 244:Giorgione 137:surprises 2066:See also 1951:Concepts 1825:Telicity 1660:Coercion 1614:Negation 1609:Modality 1559:Anaphora 1400:Category 1247:Identity 1190:Concepts 1060:Theories 1044:Zhuangzi 974:Alva NoĂ« 669:(1912), 593:(1985), 512:, p. 361 393:Attitude 377:See also 271:Overview 172:consider 110:believed 1569:Binding 1410:Project 1363:Related 1222:Concept 1077:Dualism 1050:more... 909:Goldman 659:(ed.), 552:improve 311:removed 296:sources 184:imagine 168:command 164:believe 52:Please 1998:Monads 1545:Topics 1354:Zombie 1339:Qualia 541:, but 433:Qualia 398:Belief 160:assert 150:Issues 108:(e.g. 1690:De se 1594:Focus 1552:Areas 1521:Scope 1262:Human 984:Plato 904:Fodor 473:Notes 461:See " 443:Truth 413:Habit 188:judge 180:doubt 156:logic 96:. 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Index

Intentional mental state
personal reflection, personal essay, or argumentative essay
help improve it
encyclopedic style
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proposition
philosophy
Linguistically
verb
directions of fit
lie
surprises
explanations
logic
recalcitrance
Use–mention distinction
indiscernibility of identicals
Giorgio Barbarelli
sobriquet

cite
sources
improve this section
adding citations to reliable sources
removed
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intentionality
linguistic modality
Accessibility relation
Affect (linguistics)

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